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May, 1952
CASE COMMENTS
LIFE INSURANCE-DIVISION OF THE SPOILS OF A
MURDER CASE-A notorious Colorado murder case, Downey
v. People,1 in which life insurance policies on the victim evi-
dently supplied the motive for her murder by her husband, the
beneficiary, has an interesting aftermath giving half of the in-
surance proceeds to the murderer's mother. A nice question of
insurance contract contruction is presented.
David Downey and his wife, Lila, were married in April,
1946. The following month he caused her life to be insured in
his favor for $10,000, naming his mother as contingent beneficiary.
Three months later he procured two like policies of $5,000 each,
this time naming a friend of his wife as contingent beneficiary.
In July of the following year he murdered his wife. He was con-
victed and sentenced to life imprisonment, and this judgment
was affirmed.
Downey was the beneficiary of all of the policies "if living"
at the death of his wife. One Beck, as administrator of the wife's
estate, brought suit against both insurers in a California state
court. One of these, Beck v. Downey et al.,2 in which the mother-
in-law was the contingent beneficiary, was removed to the federal
court and finally came before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. The other case, Beck v. West Coast Life Insurance Com-
pany, et al., 3 remained in the state court and eventually reached
the Supreme Court of California. These two appellate courts
arrived at irreconcilable conclusions.
The federal district court awarded the policy proceeds to the
contingent beneficiary mother-in-law on the theory that because
of his sentence to life imprisonment, David Downey was "civilly
dead" under California law, and hence the contingency clause
became effective. The federal appellate court, however, reversed
this ruling, holding that Downey was still legally alive under
Colorado law (which, it was said, governed the question of dis-
ability), but could not profit by his own wrong and had forfeited
his rights under the policy, and that the "if living" clause in
the policy barred a taking by the contingent beneficiary. That
clause meant, the court said, that the first beneficiary must be
"dead and buried" before the contingency clause could become
operative, and it concluded, and so ordered, that the policy pro-
ceeds belonged to iLila Downey's estate.
In the state couPt, however, a different result was reached.
'121 Colo. 307, 215 P. 2d 892.
2191 F. 2d 150, August 6, 1951.
'241 P. 2d 544, March 21, 1952.
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It was there held, as in the federal decision, on the principle
that no one can profit by his own wrong, that Downey had for-
feited all right under the policy. But the state supreme court
rejected the reasoning of the federal appellate court as to dis-
position of the insurance proceeds, and held that they must go
to the contingent beneficiary. This was on the premises that Lila
Downey, by naming a contingent beneficiary, had clearly indi-
cated her intention that, failing a first beneficiary, the contingent
beneficiary should take in preference to her estate; and the court
gave effect to this intention by awarding the proceeds of the
policies to that individual.
In the meantime the defeated mother-in-law petitioned for
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, seeking review of
the adverse decision of the federal appellate court. On March 31,
1952, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment
in favor of the estate, and remanded the case to the Court of
Appeals "for further consideration in the light of Beck v. West
Coast Life Insurance Company, decided by the Supreme Court of
California on March 21, 1952." 4
This seems to be an effective lefthanded way of telling the
lower federal court it would be wise to follow the state court
decision and confer the bloody spoils on the murderer's mother,




of the Dcnver Bar
On December 10, 1891, Kit Carson, Jr., in the course of an
affray in which he was engaging with one Richards, discharged
his revolver at random and killed Richards' wife, Manulita. He
was charged with murder. Under practice, and by virtue of
statute,1 it would be necessary to allege in addition to the formal
parts only the following: "That Kit Carson, Jr., on December 10,
1891, at the County of Bent, State of Colorado, did feloniously,
wilfully and of his malice aforethought kill and murder Manulita
Richards." But here is how it actually was done: 2
"That Kit Carson, Jr., on the 10th day of December,
A. D. 1891, at the said County of Bent, did then and there
in and upon one Manulita Richards, in the peace of the
120 Law Week 3258, April 1, 1952.
'35 C.S.A., c. 48, §453.
' Carson v. People, 4 Colo. App. 463, 464, 36 P. 551.
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